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Abstract—New pervasive technologies often reveal many sen-
sitive information about users’ habits, seriously compromising
the privacy and sometimes even the personal security of people.
To cope with this problem, researchers have developed the
idea of privacy-preserving data mining which refers to the
possibility of releasing aggregate information about the data
provided by multiple users, without any information leakage
about individual data. These techniques have different privacy
levels and communication costs, but all of them can suffer when
some users’ data becomes inaccessible during the operation of
the privacy preserving protocols. It is thus interesting to validate
the applicability of such architectures in real-world scenarios.
In this paper we experimentally evaluate two promising privacy-
preserving techniques on PlanetLab, analyzing the execution time
and the failure rate that each scheme exhibits.
Index Terms—secret sharing, privacy, data mining, secure
multi-party computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving data mining refers to the possibility to
release aggregate information about the data provided by mul-
tiple users, without any information leakage about individual
data [1]. This possibility is particularly significant in the
emerging scenario of pervasive technologies that constantly
track users’ location, energy consumption, visited web sites,
music and movie downloads: undoubtedly, data correlation can
reveal many sensitive information about users’ habits.
Two main approaches have been proposed so far for privacy-
preserving data mining: altering the data before delivering
them to the data miner in such a way that the aggregation
results are not compromised, or relying upon more sites that
have to cooperate to get the mining results. Data alteration
solutions may introduce mining errors, if the alteration is based
on random noise [2], and may result extremely complex when
homomorphic data encryption is employed [3]. We therefore
choose to follow the second approach, exploiting multi-party
computation protocols.
Multi-party computation protocols have been designed to
compute a function of the data collected from multiple users,
without revealing any information except for the final value of
the function. Typical architectures for multi-party computation
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rely on multiple (independent) computation sites, which pro-
cess randomized versions of the users’ data provided by the
so called input peers. Different solutions for distributing data
among the computation sites exist, based on logic circuits [4],
arithmetic circuits [5], or linear secret sharing schemes [6].
Solutions based on linear secret shares computed over small
fields, such as Sharemind [7], SEPIA [8], P4P [9] and [10],
have been recently demonstrated to effectively scale to large
numbers of users. In [11] we put forth two promising secure
sum protocols for privacy preserving data mining and analyt-
ically quantified the privacy degree and the communication
cost that they achieve, as well as their reliability in unstable
scenarios, that is, when users unpredictably depart and their
data are no longer available. The examined architecture was
based on a central data mining server and on users grouped in
logical clouds where their data are preliminarily aggregated.
The current contribution complements the previous theoretical
work, exploring the performance of the proposed schemes in
the real testbed environment of PlanetLab.
II. SCENARIO AND PROPOSAL
A. Background
To protect the users’ sensitive data during the data mining
process, we rely upon the Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS)
scheme [13]. For this scheme the dealer, who owns a secret
s, splits it into n pieces, called shares: the knowledge of any
k, with k ≤ n, or more shares allows the reconstruction of s,
whereas the knowledge of fewer than k shares leaves the secret
undetermined. This is a typical (k, n)-threshold scheme. To
generate the shares, the dealer randomly selects the (k−1) co-
efficients of a polynomial p(x) whose degree is k−1 and sets
the known term p(0) equal to the secret itself; then the n shares
are determined as: sh1(s) = [x1, p(x1) mod q], sh2(s) =
[x2, p(x2) mod q], · · · , shn(s) = [xn, p(xn) mod q], where
x1, x2, ..., xn are arbitrary integers, or seeds, and q is a prime
number larger than both s and n. Interpolating k or more
shares it is possible to reconstruct the polynomial coefficients
and then obtain s as p(0).
Note that when k = n, the shares can be created in a much
simpler way, following the so-called trivial secret sharing
scheme: in this case the first (n − 1) shares are randomly
picked in [0, q] in accordance to a uniform distribution, then
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Fig. 1. Multi-Cloud Scenario
the last share is computed as (s − sh1(s) − sh2(s) − · · · −
shn−1(s)) mod q.
Both schemes exhibit the homomorphic property: when two
(or more) secrets are considered, e.g., s1 and s2, the sum of
two shares of s1 and s2 is a share of s1 + s2, the sum of the
secrets. In the specific case of SSS, for this property to hold
it is required that the shares of different secrets be evaluated
for the same seed y: so, given shares sh(s1) = [y, p1(y)] and
sh(s2) = [y, p2(y)], sh(s1) + sh(s2) is a share of s1 + s2.
B. Framework and Hypotheses
We next describe the partly distributed, privacy preserving
architecture proposed to mine the data of a group of users
respecting their privacy. We focus on those statistical learning
strategies whose update laws require linear operations such
as vector addition: on one hand, this allows to exploit the
homomorphic property that the previously introduced secret
sharing strategies display; on the other, the linear feature
is exhibited by several popular data mining algorithms, and
therefore does not represent a severe restriction.
We assume that a central unit is interested in knowing the
aggregate behaviour of the users, grouped in proper clusters,
and that this knowledge has to be acquired without disclosing
the single user data. The output of the privacy-preserving data
mining process will therefore turn out very useful for both
the data miner and the users whose data are being mined;
no privacy leakage will occur, an attractive feature given the
mining technique typically collects personal, sensitive data.
Rather than the large field operations required by public-key
cryptography or homomorphic encryption, we will rely upon
SSS scheme to protect users’ data from external and internal
attackers. Although SSS natively supports both secure addition
and multiplication, we limit our analysis to secure sums
because a large number of popular data mining and machine
learning algorithms can be decomposed and parallelized in
simple additions [9].
Let us therefore refer to a multi-cloud scenario where, as
depicted in Fig. 1, we have:
• one central unit, also called profiling server, that acts
as the data miner and takes on the role of clocking the
mining protocol;
• N users (interchangeably termed nodes in what follows)
grouped in multiple clouds on the basis of their geograph-
ical location: we will denote by Ncloud the number of
clouds and by Nnode = N/Ncloud the number of nodes
in each cloud (with no loss in generality, N is assumed
to be a multiple of Ncloud).
In this model the profiling server is honest-but-curious, so it
follows the protocol without cheating, but it is not totally
trusted: it might want to access the users’ data for its own
purposes. Users will be modeled as honest-but-curious parties
too: each of them can collude with other nodes within the
same cloud and/or with the server, against one or more
victims. Moreover, nodes are not permanently connected to
the network: there is a non-null probability p that the node
status be off, due to either intermittent network connectivity
or sudden departure of the user from the network; finally, users
independently fail. Examples are wireless users, or users of a
peer-to-peer overlay.
The unstable network scenario we just depicted can severely
impair the effectiveness of the proposed architectures: we
therefore evaluate not only the time needed for each scheme
to be completed, but also their robustness against host failures
and loss of users’ data.
Note that compared to other solutions, we do not rely on
trusted third parties or “privacy peers” (as in SEPIA), thus
completely eliminating the risk of third party collusion. As
we will show, this property comes at the cost of slower
performance because the secure protocol involves generic
peers in the network without any control on their computing
capacity or load. This is the price to be paid to guarantee this
desired privacy degree.
C. Base Scheme
In this scheme we propose to employ SSS technique and
take advantage of its homomorphic property separately in each
cloud. During the distribution phase (DP), shares are created
and distributed among the users belonging to the same cloud;
during the collection phase (CP), k sums of shares will be
delivered to the server, as detailed below. The DP starts when
the server randomly triggers a node within each cloud: let us
denote this node as node i. Node i of a generic cloud:
1) makes Nnode shares of its secret data di following
Shamir (k,Nnode)-threshold scheme, using the nodes
identifiers, j = 0, 1, . . . , i, · · · , (Nnode − 1), as seeds;
2) keeps for itself share shi(di) = [i, pi(i) mod q];
3) sends share shj(di) = [j, pi(j) mod q] to node j of its
cloud, j = 0, 1, . . . , (Nnode − 1), j 6= i.
When receiving node i share, every node in the cloud learns
that it is time to compute the shares of its secret: it therefore
behaves as node i, retaining the share computed with its
identifier as seed and sending all other shares to the proper
node within the cloud.
Once node i has received the (Nnode − 1) shares from the
nodes within its same cloud, it sums them up and determines
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Fig. 2. Distribution Phase example with Nnode = 9 and z = 4
Si =
∑Nnode
j=0 shi(dj) = [i,
∑Nnode−1
j=0 pj(i) mod q], which
owing to the homomorphic property, is a share of the sum of
the secrets. Now the CP begins: during this phase k uniformly
randomly designated nodes within each cloud send the server
the partial sum they computed along with their identifier: in
detail, node h sends the (h, Sh) pair, the server collects k of
such contributions, by interpolation finds the polynomial and
then the sum of the secrets for that cloud, Scloud =
∑Nnode
i=1 di.
Summing together the contributions from all clouds, the server
obtains the sum of all users’ secrets, as desired.
Note that during the DP and CP each user owns Nnode
shares of Nnode different secrets: not enough to recover any
valuable information about other users. The server only knows
partial sums and cannot recover the data of the single user
either. However, if k nodes in a cloud are corrupted and form
a coalition, they can collect k shares of the other users in the
cloud and disclose their secret data: it is therefore important
to properly set k ·Nnode to a sufficiently high value.
D. Enhanced Scheme
When the number of nodes within each cloud grows, the
distribution phase of the base scheme becomes considerably
burdensome. To relieve it, we observe that it is not necessary
that in each cloud the generic node sends its secret data shares
to every other node.
Accordingly, we modify the previous proposal and employ
a (k′, z)-threshold scheme, with z < Nnode and k′ ≤ z, as
better detailed next.
Within each cloud, we divide all nodes in z different sets
Ir , r = 0, 1, . . . , (z − 1), based on the node identifier, j, so
that set Ir includes all nodes such that their identifier satisfies
the condition
Ir = {all nodes with identifier j | j mod z = r} (1)
As an example, with Nnode = 9 and z = 4, we have I0 =
{0, 4, 8}, I1 = {1, 5}, I2 = {2, 6} and I3 = {3, 7}. Now we
require node i to interact with a reduced number of nodes,
namely, node i
1) makes z shares based on the (k′, z)-threshold scheme,
using 0 ≤ r ≤ (z − 1) as seed: shr(di) =
[r, pi(r) mod q];
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Fig. 3. Collecting Phase example with Nnode = 9, z = 4 and k′ = 2
2) keeps the share evaluated in r = i mod z;
3) sends shr(di) to a randomly selected node within set
Ir, ∀r ∈ [0, (z − 1)] and r 6= i mod z;
Resuming the previous example, node 1 of Fig. 2 keeps
for itself sh1(d1) and might choose to send the remaining
z − 1 = 3 shares as follows: share sh0(d1) to node 4 in I0,
share sh2(d1) to node 2 in I2 and share sh3(d1) to node 3
in I3, as the red lines in Fig. 2 indicate; this is simply an
example, any combination fulfilling the previous constraints
is equally acceptable. At the end of the DP, nodes within the
same set Ir will possess only shares evaluated in r = i mod z:
note that not all the nodes within a set might receive shares (as
it happens for node 0 in Fig. 2). Next, the CP begins: within
set Ir, each node sums to the share it kept for itself the shares
that it might have received, to compute a partial sum, Si for
node i. Then such partial sums Si’s are collected, in order to
determine SIr =
∑
i∈Ir
Si =
∑Nnode−1
i=0 shr(di): a possible
choice is to accumulate them in a round robin manner, starting
from a specific node triggered by the server, that transmits
its contribution to the next downstream node, and gradually
covering all other nodes within the set. For the toy example
we introduced earlier (see Fig. 3), given that within set I0
node 0 is triggered, this node sends S0 (which is the sum of
its share sh0(d0) plus the shares that it might have received
during the previous DP) to node 4; node 4 then adds S4 and
forwards everything to node 8, that adds S8. It is up to node
8 to deliver SI0 that it just completed to the server. Now it is
sufficient that any k′ of such sums of shares computed in k′
distinct sets of the same cloud be transferred to the server for
it to recover Scloud, the sum of the data for the Nnode users
belonging to the examined cloud:
Scloud =
Nnode−1∑
i=0
di , (2)
where, as for the previous scheme, last equality stems from
the application of the homomorphic property to the partial
sum provided by the single cloud; as desired, the sum of
the users’ data is recovered, without disclosing any of the
single contributions to the data miner. Taking into account
the presence of more clouds is rather straightforward: the
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Fig. 4. Performance of the base scheme with 30, 60 and 90 nodes respectively.
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Fig. 5. CDF of the duration of the DP and CP periods for the base scheme with Nnode = 30, 60 and 90 nodes.
contributions of all clouds have to be gathered, where each
of them is in the form of (2), so that the sum S of all users’
data is finally available to the server.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Since secret sharing protocols are sensitive to node failures
and data losses, it is important to validate the applicability of
the proposed schemes in real-world scenarios. For this reason,
we developed both architectures in Java and run over 5000
experiments on a PlanetLab testbed. The schemes have been
implemented as described in Section II, activating two server
sockets in each node, responsible of managing the distribution
phase DP and the collection phase CP. Connections towards
the peer nodes are established and closed run-time by each
node, for disseminating the shares in the cloud, and for col-
lecting the sum of the shares aggregated by each participating
node.
Configuration. For each experiment, we build clouds us-
ing Nnode PlanetLab nodes, which have been organized in
geographically close sets (grouping them by country) to op-
timize the performance of the communication rings. For the
base scheme, we consider different values of Nnode (namely,
Nnode = 30, 60, 90), while for the enhanced scheme we
choose Nnode = 90 and vary the number of sets z = 3, 5, 10
(resulting in |Ir| = 30, 18, 9 nodes per set). For each scenario,
we repeat the experiments at least 100 times, monitoring
the duration of the share distribution phase and collection
phase, as well as the failure rate of the nodes, that is, the
probability that it is not possible to recover the data of the
nodes belonging to the same cloud during the experiment.
Indeed, we constantly monitor the state of the nodes in order
to exclude nodes which are down at the beginning of the
experiment, but once the experiment starts, failures cannot be
recovered. It is also interesting to monitor the number of partial
sums eventually recovered by the first node in the ring (which
in our implementation is responsible for collecting all the sums
of shares), from which an optimal tuning of k can be obtained
for achieving a desired success probability.
Base Scheme. Figure 4 summarizes the results obtained for
the base scheme, when k is equal to the number of nodes in
the ring, i.e. the number of shares generated by each node
is equal to Nnode. The three distinct figures report the CDF
(Cumulative Distribution Function) of the number of hosts
participating in the experiments1 (black line), the number of
shares received by node 1 during the DP (red line) and the
number of sums of shares collected during the CP (green line),
for different Nnode values. These figures reveal that the base
scheme exhibits a good performance in those setups where
Nnode = 30 or 60: here the number of collected sums is
typically coincident with the number of participating hosts
minus 1 (the collecting node is not counted). However, as the
number of nodes increases, the probability of collecting no
data (because node 1 fails or the CP experiences a timeout)
increases: it is equal to 0.2 when Nnode = 90.
Figure 5 depicts the CDF of the duration for the DP and CP
phase measured at node 1, which is also the node responsible
for the ignition of the CP. It clearly emerges that large rings
result in long running times (especially during the DP), which
1Note that some PlanetLab hosts were temporarily down or unreachable
already before the beginning of the experiments so the number of hosts
participating to the scheme was slightly below the corresponding Nnode
value.
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Fig. 6. CDF of the DP period duration for the base scheme with 30, 60 and
90 nodes.
in turn increases the probability of experiencing node failures
during the scheme execution. Since the CP is meaningful only
when all the nodes complete the dissemination of their shares,
it is necessary to consider a waiting time before starting the
CP (which we set to 300s). Moreover, to avoid nodes being
blocked into the distribution phase while some nodes of the
rings are not available, we also set-up a timeout equal to
600s to interrupt the distribution towards the inactive nodes.
The effects of this timer are clearly visible from the figure:
as the ring size increases, an increasing percentage of nodes
experiences a timeout during the DP (from about 5% when
Nnode = 30 to about 20% when Nnode = 90), which is
reflected into the total time required for completing the DP
and CP (green curves).
Analyzing the root cause of these delays in greater detail,
figure 6 shows the duration of the DP for each node across
all experiments (note that the CP duration can be measured
only by node 1 and it is shown in figure 5). While for the
Nnode = 30 case the delay is almost constant for all the
nodes and lower than 100s, as the ring size gets larger, a
significant fraction of nodes has a DP with random distribution
in the [100s − 500s] range, while about 5% of the nodes
terminate the DP because of the timeout expiration. As we will
explain shortly, these high and variable running times are not
due to failures but to overloaded PlanetLab hosts which react
very slowly to communications. However, since the aggregated
data can be recovered when k secret sums are available, by
opportunistically limiting the k value to the fraction of nodes
which complete the DP in a reasonable time, it is possible to
limit the latency of the privacy-preserving aggregation process.
For example, for Nnode = 60, when k = Nnode/2 a sufficient
number of sums can be available within 200s. In the basic
scheme, the reason for such high delays is due to the fact the
the DP involves all the nodes in the cloud and requires the
exchange of Nnode(Nnode − 1) messages. Still, depending on
the use case, such running times are acceptable for the well
functioning of the application, and guarantees privacy without
relying on third parties.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the failures seen across
the participating nodes. The figure shows that the probability
of the single nodes failing during the experiments is overall
quite low, with almost all of the nodes failing less than 10% of
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Fig. 7. CDF of the node failure probability for the base scheme with 30, 60
and 90 nodes.
the times. This relatively small failure probability still can have
a non negligible impact when the basic scheme is employed,
especially in scenarios where the running time is quite long,
i.e., when the number of involved nodes is large. In such cases,
the enhanced scheme provides much higher performances, as
we will show next.
Enhanced Scheme. The enhanced scheme has been designed
for mitigating the impact of slow hosts in the dissemination of
the shares. Indeed, nodes are organized into sets and the total
number of shares to be distributed is equal to the number of
sets. Figure 8 summarizes the overall results achieved by this
scheme with Nnode = 90 and with an increasing number of
sets (z = 3, 5 and 10). In this experiment, for each set, shares
are sent to a randomly selected nodes. The figure shows the
number of hosts active during the experiments, the number
of shares received by each host (random with average z), the
number of partial sums received by node 1 of each set (close
to |Ir|) and the total number of shares collected in each set
(ideally equal to the number of nodes). The figure shows that
the total number of shares collected by node 1 of each set
closely follows the number of participating nodes and that the
best performance is achieved when z = 3. Indeed, when z
is small the number of shares to be sent is small as well,
with lower delays and higher probability of success, while
with large values of z the enhanced scheme tends to the basic
scheme and the total number of shares collected deviates from
the desired result.
Finally, figure 9 shows that the enhanced scheme dramat-
ically reduces the duration of both DP and CP, resulting in
a much shorter time needed to complete the gathering of the
data. Interestingly, the running time is almost insensitive with
respect to the number of sets and overall over 80% of the
experiments lasted less than 200 seconds, which results into a
time reduction equal to 67% compared to the equivalent basic
scheme.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have experimentally investigated the
performance of two partly distributed multi-cloud, privacy-
preserving schemes suitable for data mining algorithms based
on linear operations. Two different approaches have been
considered, a basic and an enhanced scheme: their behavior
has been experimentally assessed on PlanetLab for validating
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Fig. 8. Performance of the enhanced scheme with 90 nodes and z = 3, z = 5 and z = 10.
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Fig. 9. CDF of the duration for the enhanced scheme with Nnode = 90 nodes and z = 3, z = 5 and z = 10
the feasibility of the approach and for providing some insights
useful for the tuning of the scheme operational parameters. Ex-
perimental results show that unexpected latencies may emerge,
especially during the distribution of the shares, because of
the time-varying load of PlanetLab nodes. To mitigate the
effects of these latencies on the overall time required for data
aggregation, it is possible to select a secret sharing scheme
with a threshold value much lower than the total number of
shares (e.g. k = Nnode/2) for the basic scheme case or to
opportunistically choose the number of sets for the enhanced
scheme.
Although, overall, the enhanced scheme offers a reduced
latency, it is important to observe that there are also some
potential complications in its implementation. Indeed, for the
basic scheme, each node can independently verify that it has
collected the total number of expected shares (i.e. Nnode− 1)
and drop the sum of the received shares whenever this number
is lower than expected. This means that each sum received
by the server is a useful data and that the reception of k
sums guarantees the reconstruction of the aggregated data.
Conversely, for the enhanced scheme, a share of the aggregated
data is not available at a single node, but only collecting the
shares received by each node of a set. Therefore, it is necessary
to consider a mechanism to track the total number of shares
collected in each set.
REFERENCES
[1] V. S. Verykios, E. Bertino, I. N. Fovino, L. P. Provenza, Y. Saygin,
and Y. Theodoridis, “State-of-the-art in privacy preserving data mining,”
SIGMOD Rec., vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 50–57, Mar. 2004.
[2] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant, “Privacy-preserving data mining,” in Proceed-
ings of the 2000 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management
of Data, ser. SIGMOD ’00. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2000, pp. 439–
450. [Online]. Available: {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/342009.335438}
[3] Z. Erkin, T. Veugen, T. Toft, and R. Lagendijk, “Privacy-preserving user
clustering in a social network,” in Information Forensics and Security,
2009. WIFS 2009. First IEEE Int. Workshop on, Dec 2009, pp. 96–100.
[4] A. C. C. Yao, “How to generate and exchange secrets,” in 27th Founda-
tions of Computer Science (FOCS), 1986, pp. 162–167.
[5] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson, “Completeness theorems
for non-cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation,” in 20th
ACM symposium on Theory of computing (STOC), 1988, pp. 1–10.
[6] R. Cramer, I. Damgard, and U. Maurer, “Multiparty computations from
any linear secret sharing scheme,” in Int. Conference on the Theory and
Application of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT), 2000.
[7] S. Bogdanov, D. Laur and J. Willemson, “Sharemind: A framework for
fast privacy-preserving computations,” in 13th European Symposium on
Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), vol. 5283, Oct 2008, pp.
192–206.
[8] M. M. D. Burkhart, M. Strasser and X. Dimitropoulos, “Sepia: Privacy-
preserving aggregation of multi-domain network events and statistics,” in
19th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX), 2010, pp. 223–240.
[9] Y. Duan, J. Canny, and J. Zhan, “P4p: practical large-scale privacy-
preserving distributed computation robust against malicious users,” in
USENIX Security Symposium, Aug. 2010.
[10] A. Iacovazzi, A. D’Alconzo, F. Ricciato, and M. Burkhart. Elementary
secure-multiparty computation for massive-scale collaborative network
monitoring. Comput. Netw. vol. 57, no. 17 (Dec. 2013), pp. 3728–3742.
[11] M.L. Merani, C. Barcellona, I. Tinnirello,“Multi-Cloud Privacy Preserv-
ing Schemes for Linear Data Mining,” in IEEE ICC 2015, June 2015.
[12] C. Clifton, M. Kantarcioglu, J. Vaidya, X. Lin, and M. Y. Zhu, “Tools
for privacy preserving distributed data mining,” in SIGKDD Explorations,
2002, pp. 28–24.
[13] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” in Communications of the ACM,
vol. 22, no. 11, pp. 612–613, 1979.
[14] J. Dun, “A fuzzy relative of the ISODATA process and its use in
detecting compact well-separated clusters,” in Journal of Cybernetics,
pp. 32-57, 1973.
384
